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THE “TOO BIG TO FAIL” PENALTY: A NEW ERA OF
INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE WAKE OF THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS
INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) into law, advancing
one of the most far-reaching efforts in financial reform since the Great
Depression.1 The Dodd-Frank Act, created in response to the financial crisis of
2008, has as one of its main goals the end of excessive risk-taking in the
financial services industry.2 The Dodd-Frank Act created several new
regulatory agencies and rules to further this goal.3 This new regulatory regime
seeks to rein in “systemically important financial institutions,” or “SIFIs,”
which are financial institutions so large that their downfall would cause wideranging damage throughout the entire American economy.4
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”), one of the agencies
created by the Dodd-Frank Act, has the authority to label non-bank financial
companies as SIFIs.5 Once FSOC labels a non-bank financial company as a
SIFI, the Federal Reserve can impose strict regulations upon the company,
such as the requirement to hold a greater amount of capital in order to absorb
potential losses.6 In June 2013, FSOC designated large insurers, such as
American International Group Inc. and Prudential Financial Inc., as SIFIs.7 In
1 Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform (last visited Feb. 3, 2016); Jesse Lee, President Obama
Signs Wall Street Reform: ‘No Easy Task,’ WHITE HOUSE (July 21, 2010, 2:22 PM), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/blog/2010/07/21/president-obama-signs-wall-street-reform-no-easy-task; Steven J. Markovich, The DoddFrank Act, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/united-states/dodd-frankact/p28735.
2 Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 1.
3 Markovich, supra note 1.
4 Ctr. for Regulatory Strategies, SIFI Designation and its Potential Impact on Nonbank Financial
Companies 1, DELOITTE (2013), http://fsroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/SIFI-designation-and-itspotential-impact-on-nonbank-financial-companies.pdf.
5 Designations, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/
designations/Pages/default.aspx (last updated July 27, 2015, 4:38 PM).
6 Ctr. for Regulatory Strategies, supra note 4.
7 Jeff Sistrunk, MetLife Continues SIFI Fight Alone 5 Years After Dodd-Frank, LAW360 (July 22, 2015,
4:58 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/681664/metlife-continues-sifi-fight-alone-5-years-after-doddfrank.

PIERCE GALLEYSFINAL

226

4/20/2016 11:05 AM

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW

[Vol. 3

December of that year, FSOC designated MetLife, the largest life insurance
company in North America,8 as a SIFI.9 In January 2015, MetLife became the
first non-bank to challenge its SIFI status when it filed suit against FSOC in
D.C. federal court.10
MetLife has also pursued another tactic in its fight to ease its regulatory
burden: it plans to divest itself of a major part of its U.S. life insurance unit.11
By placing higher capital requirements on SIFIs, the regulatory regime created
by the Dodd-Frank Act is indirectly encouraging large firms like MetLife to
break up.12 The once “too big to fail” companies are being penalized for their
size, as SIFI status results in a regulatory burden that brings down profits.13
This Essay will examine the development of the new regulatory regime
established by the Dodd-Frank Act and will argue that the indirect breaking up
of SIFIs has resulted in less systemic risk in the financial services industry.
Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Act and the Federal Reserve’s intervention in the
insurance industry may signal the beginning of a new era of regulation: one
where federal regulators take a more active role in the state-dominated
insurance regulatory system.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE DODD-FRANK ACT
In the years leading up to the Dodd-Frank Act, the world economy was
marked by low, stable interest rates.14 Such an environment of low interest
rates spurred on investors like commercial banks, investment banks, and hedge
funds to seek novel ways of generating profits.15 Investors were drawn to
8 MetLife Begins, METLIFE, https://www.metlife.com/about/corporate-profile/metlife-history/metlifebegins/index.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
9 Sistrunk, supra note 7.
10 Andrew Zajac, et al., MetLife Sues Over Too-Big-to-Fail Label by Regulators, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS
(Jan. 13, 2015, 1:08 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-13/metlife-sues-over-too-big-tofail-designation-by-u-s-regulators; see Caroline Simson, MetLife Takes SIFI Designation Challenge to DC
Court, LAW360 (Jan. 13, 2015, 12:15 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/610869/metlife-takes-sifidesignation-challenge-to-dc-court.
11 Leslie Scism, MetLife to Shed Big Chunk of Life Unit, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2016, 6:59 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/metlife-looks-to-divest-u-s-life-insurance-unit-1452635005.
12 Ryan Tracy et al., Not Too Big to Fail. Too Expensive to Exist, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2016, 7:54 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/has-the-government-made-it-too-expensive-to-be-a-big-bank-1452731317?cb=
logged0.784445948433131.
13 Id.
14 The Origins of the Financial Crisis; Crash Course, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-yearsarticle.
15 Id.
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certain high-yielding assets, such as collateralized debt obligations
(“CDOs”).16 CDOs were a form of mortgage-backed security that were backed
by pools of mortgages.17 CDOs had received high credit ratings from
prominent rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, and
appeared to be relatively safe assets that produced higher returns.18 The
stability of the low interest rate environment made investors more attracted to
leverage, or the use of borrowed money to bolster returns.19 Investors assumed
that returns would be greater than the cost of borrowing, so firms took on more
debt to fund their investing operations.20 This left many large financial services
companies highly levered.21
CDOs and other mortgage-backed securities were greatly affected when the
American housing bubble burst.22 Although CDOs had received safe credit
ratings, they became worthless and unsellable when the mortgages supporting
them failed to be paid.23 The largest commercial and investment banks in the
U.S., who both issued and invested in mortgage-backed securities, were
gravely hurt by their failure to accurately value these securities.24 The SEC
later charged many of these firms for defrauding investors and misrepresenting
their true losses.25 Insurance companies were also caught in the chaos. The
massive insurance company, AIG, used a financial instrument called a “credit
default swap” to insure the CDOs, promising to indemnify the holder of the
CDO in the event of default.26 When the CDOs failed, AIG needed to
reimburse the buyers of the credit default swaps, but AIG did not have enough
capital to pay its claims.27 The heavy use of leverage in the financial services
industry left many firms with too much debt to withstand the downturn in the
16

Id.
Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 The Origins of the Financial Crisis; Crash Course, supra note 14.
21 Anat R. Admati, Address Excessive Leverage, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2011, 2:46 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/01/30/was-the-financial-crisis-avoidable/address-excessiveleverage.
22 The Origins of the Financial Crisis; Crash Course, supra note 14.
23 Id.
24 John Carney, Lehman Brothers Was Dramatically Over Valuing Its CDOs, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar.
17, 2010, 12:47 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/lehman-brothers-was-dramatically-over-valuing-itscdos-2010-3.
25 SEC Enforcement Actions Addressing Misconduct that Led to or Arose from the Financial Crisis, SEC.
AND EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml (last updated Jan. 14, 2016).
26 What Went Wrong at AIG?, KELLOGGINSIGHT (Aug. 3, 2015), http://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/
article/what-went-wrong-at-aig.
27 Id.
17
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market.28 As banks and other lenders lost faith in the creditworthiness of
borrowers, short-term lending came to a halt.29 Without the availability of
credit, the American economy in general began to suffer.30
The Dodd-Frank Act creates a raft of new rules designed to stop Wall
Street firms from dealing in and exposing themselves to the dangerous assets
characteristic of the pre-crisis years. § 619, or the “Volcker Rule,” prohibits
commercial banks from engaging in proprietary trading (the trading of
securities by a bank on its own account rather than on behalf of customers31),
and from investing in hedge funds and private equity funds.32 The principle
behind the rule is to stop deposit-taking banks, which are insured by taxpayer
dollars through the FDIC, from engaging in the type of speculative activity
characteristic of investors like hedge funds.33 The Dodd-Frank Act also grants
authority to the SEC and Commodity Futures Trading Commission to regulate
the derivatives market, which had only been lightly supervised.34 Credit default
swaps, a form of derivative, fall under this umbrella of authority.35
The Dodd-Frank Act also established a host of new federal agencies tasked
with the objective of preventing another crisis like the one in 2008.36 The
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was created as a new enforcer of
federal consumer financial law.37 It specifically deals with consumer deception
and abuse by financial companies, such as the sort of predatory lending that led
to the housing bubble.38 But most important to this Essay’s discussion of nonbank regulation is the Dodd-Frank Act’s creation of the Financial Stability

28 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, Some Reflections on the
Crisis and the Policy Response (Apr. 13, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/bernanke20120413a.htm).
29 The Origins of the Financial Crisis; Crash Course, supra note 14.
30 Id.
31 Definition of proprietary trading, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=proprietary-trading
(last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
32 Volcker Rule Resource Center: Overview, SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKTS ASSO’N, http://www.sifma.org/
issues/regulatory-reform/volcker-rule/overview/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
33 Ryan Tracy & Peter Rudegeair, Volcker Bank-Risk Rule Set to Start With Little Fanfare, WALL ST. J.
(Jul. 21, 2015, 6:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/volcker-bank-risk-rule-set-to-start-with-little-fanfare1437517061.
34 Derivatives, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml
(last updated May 4, 2015).
35 Id.
36 Markovich, supra note 1.
37 Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 1.
38 Creating the Consumer Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
the-bureau/creatingthebureau/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
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Oversight Council. Through the Dodd-Frank Act, the Federal Reserve has the
authority to impose greater capital requirements on “systemically important
financial institutions,” which are financial institutions that regulators don’t
want to become “too big to fail.”39 The Dodd-Frank Act never actually uses the
term “SIFI,” but it does refer to the concept of the institution whose collapse
would destabilize the U.S. economy.40 The Financial Stability Board, an
international body, was the first to use the label “SIFI” to refer to such
institutions.41 However, experts and journalists now use the term SIFI to refer
to the entities that the Dodd-Frank Act seeks to rein in. § 165 of the DoddFrank Act authorizes the Federal Reserve to designate a commercial bank as a
SIFI if its total assets are over $50 billion. On the other hand, the newly created
FSOC will determine whether a non-bank financial company is a SIFI.
FSOC has the broad mandate of “identifying risks to the financial stability
of the United States; promoting market discipline; and responding to emerging
risks to the stability of the United States’ financial system.”42 Lawmakers and
regulators recognize that many of the firms whose financial distress caused
widespread damage during the crisis were not traditional commercial banks,
but were rather non-banks engaged in a variety of activities that were not
regulated as heavily as banking.43 In order to address the gap in oversight over
these large, interconnected entities, and to ensure that distress at these firms
would not again cause instability in the economy, Congress has used the DoddFrank Act to broaden the authority of the federal regulatory apparatus over
non-bank financial companies.44 Under § 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act, FSOC
has the authority to designate a non-bank financial company as a SIFI if it
determines that financial distress at the non-bank financial company, or the
nature of the activities conducted by the company, could threaten the financial
stability of the United States.45

39 Jonathan Marino, The Government’s ‘Too Big to Fail’ List is Going to Change, BUS. INSIDER (Jun. 9,
2015, 11:50 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-governments-too-big-to-fail-list-is-going-to-change2015-6.
40 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 112, 12 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012).
41 About the FSB, FIN. STABILITY BD., http://www.fsb.org/about/#mandate (last visited Feb. 3, 2016);
Financial Stability Board, NAT’L ASS’N OF INSURANCE COMM’RS, http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/
topic_financial_stability_board.htm (last updated Sept. 28, 2015).
42 Financial Stability Oversight Council, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, https://www.treasury.
gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
43 Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 77 Fed.
Reg. 21,637 (Apr. 11, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310).
44 Id.
45 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 112, supra note 40.
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As a SIFI, the non-bank financial company is subject to supervision by the
Federal Reserve, and must comply with heightened standards on capital
reserves, liquidity, and risk management.46 FSOC and the Federal Reserve
follow a multi-step framework for imposing SIFI status on nonbank financial
companies: (i) first, FSOC determines if the nonbank is “predominately
engaged in financial activities;” (ii) if FSOC so determines, then FSOC applies
a three-step analysis for determining whether the nonbank financial company
is “systemically important;” (iii) if FSOC deems that company as systemically
important, then FSOC labels the company as a SIFI; and (iv) the Federal
Reserve places heavy regulatory burdens on the SIFI.47
II. THE SIFI DESIGNATION PROCESS
At the first step of the framework, FSOC analyzes whether the non-bank is
actually a financial company. § 102 of the Act defines a “U.S. nonbank
financial company” as a company other than a bank holding company, national
securities exchange, or certain types of entities involved in the swap and
derivatives markets, that is “(i) incorporated or organized under the laws of the
United States or any State; and (ii) predominantly engaged in financial
activities.”48 The Act goes on to state that a company is “predominately
engaged in financial activities” if (i) 85 percent or more of the company’s
annual gross revenues are derived from activities that are defined as financial
in nature in the Bank Holding Company Act; or (ii) 85 percent or more of the
company’s consolidated assets are related to activities that are defined as
financial in nature under the Bank Holding Company Act.49 The Bank Holding
Company Act defines a broad range of activities as “financial in nature,”
including lending, insuring, underwriting securities, and providing financial
advisory services.50
Although the Dodd-Frank Act defines “nonbank financial company,” it
leaves a major job open to the rulemaking function of the Federal Reserve. The
Act states that the Federal Reserve “shall establish, by regulation, the

46

Id. § 115.
Definitions of ‘‘Predominantly Engaged in Financial Activities’’ and ‘‘Significant’’ Nonbank
Financial Company and Bank Holding Company, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,756 (Apr. 13, 2015) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 242); Authority To Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies,
77 Fed. Reg. at 21,641.
48 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 102.
49 Id.
50 Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2010).
47
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requirements for determining if a company is predominantly engaged in
financial activities.51“ In April 2013, the Federal Reserve approved a final rule
that established the criteria that FSOC must follow in determining whether a
company is “predominantly engaged in financial activities.”52 The rule
includes a “two-year test based on consolidated financial statements,” that
clarifies the “85 percent or more” language of § 102 of the Dodd-Frank Act.53
The rule states that a company is predominately engaged in financial activities
if in either of its two most recently completed fiscal years, 85 percent or more
of its consolidated annual gross revenues were financial revenues, or if 85
percent or more of its consolidated assets were financial assets.54
If FSOC finds that the company is predominately engaged in financial
activities, then at the second step of the framework, FSOC analyzes the
systemic importance of the company. In one of the only rules issued by FSOC,
the agency states that § 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act sets out two standards for
systemic importance: the “First Determination Standard,” where “material
financial distress at the nonbank financial company could pose a threat to the
financial stability of the United States;” and the “Second Determination
Standard,” where “the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration,
interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the nonbank financial company
could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.”55 FSOC uses
a three-stage review process to assess whether the company meets either of the
two Determination Standards.56 Although the review is based on quantitative
data, FSOC does not believe that the process can be “reduced to a formula.”57
The second and third stages are designed to be “flexible” and “companyspecific,” accounting for the “unique risks” posed by each company.58
At the first stage of the review, FSOC seeks to sift out potential SIFIs from
the vast pool of non-banks in the financial services industry.59 To do this,
FSOC paints with a broad brush by applying a uniform quantitative test across
the entire group of non-bank financial companies. To move on to second stage
51

Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 112, supra note 40.
78 Fed. Reg. 20, supra note 47.
53 Id. at 20,757.
54 Id.
55 Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 21,640 (Apr. 11, 2012).
56 Id. at 21,641.
57 Id. at 21,642.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 21,643.
52
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of the review, the company must meet a threshold of $50 billion in total
consolidated assets, and then must meet one of several different numerical
thresholds, such as $30 billion in credit default swaps, $20 billion in
outstanding debt, or a 15 to 1 leverage ratio.60 At the second stage, FSOC
considers a variety of industry- and company-specific factors, applying a
quantitative and qualitative analysis generally focused on the company’s (i)
size, (ii) interconnectedness, (iii) substitutability, (iv) leverage, (v) liquidity
risk and maturity mismatch,61 and (vi) existing regulatory scrutiny.62 At the
third stage, FSOC considers several qualitative factors, such as the company’s
“resolvability, the opacity of its operations, its complexity, and the extent and
nature of its existing regulatory scrutiny.”63
Once it determines that a company satisfies all three stages, FSOC will
move onto the third step of the framework and finally label the company as a
SIFI.64 At this point, the Federal Reserve has the authority under the DoddFrank Act to regulate the non-bank SIFI. At the fourth and final step of the
framework, the Federal Reserve will subject the SIFI to a range of regulatory
actions. § 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act mandates that the Federal Reserve must
require the SIFI to adhere to “enhanced prudential standards.65“ Most
significantly, these standards require the SIFI acquire less capital through the
use of leverage, and to hold more risk-based capital, which is the amount of
capital a company must hold in order to protect creditors and consumers from
the company’s anticipated risks.66
The mandated prudential standards also cover liquidity, risk-management,
credit exposure reporting, and resolution planning.67 Each SIFI must submit a
“resolution plan” to the Federal Reserve, FSOC, and the FDIC. 68 The

60

This specific leverage ratio is calculated by dividing total consolidated assets by total equity. Id.
Maturity mismatch occurs when a company has more short-term liabilities than short-term assets, but
has more total assets than long-term liabilities. Maturity Mismatch, BUS. DICTIONARY, http://www.
businessdictionary.com/definition/maturity-mismatch.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
62 Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 21,641, 21,645 (Apr. 11, 2012).
63 Id. at 21,646.
64 Id.
65 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 112, supra note 40.
66 Id; Risk-Based Capital, SOL. OF ACTUARIES, http://rmtf.soa.org/riskbased_capital.pdf (last visited
Feb. 3, 2016).
67 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 112, supra note 40.
68 Id.
61
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resolution, or “living will,”69 must describe the SIFI’s plan for “rapid and
orderly resolution in the event of material financial distress or failure.”70 The
Act also allows the Federal Reserve to impose further regulations on the SIFI
in regards to contingent capital requirements,71 enhanced public disclosures,
short-term debt limits, and any other requirements that the Federal Reserve
deems appropriate.72 Finally, a SIFI must undergo an annual “stress test” by
the Federal Reserve, and must conduct stress tests on itself semi-annually.73
The stress test evaluates the company’s performance in a hypothetical scenario
of economic distress.74
III. THE EFFECTS OF SIFI STATUS ON NON-BANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES
SIFI designation has had a very real effect on the four non-bank financial
companies labeled as SIFIs so far: AIG, MetLife, Prudential, and GE Capital
Corporation.75 Although the Federal Reserve makes SIFIs safer through the
requirement that SIFIs follow conservative financial standards, safety is not the
driving factor of stock price.76 In January 2016, the stock price of MetLife fell
by 13% and Prudential’s fell by 15%.77 The requirement that SIFIs hold more
capital explains the cause of this drop. Firms that are funded with more equity
instead of debt can withstand more loss, but they also seem less profitable to
investors because greater capital reserves reduce shareholders’ return on
equity.78 Companies that receive the SIFI label are put at a significant
disadvantage.79 Currently, shares of smaller financial companies and banks not
labeled SIFIs are trading at a much higher value than those of SIFI

69 Resolution Plans, FEDERAL RESERVE, http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans.htm
(last updated Jan. 15, 2016).
70 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 112, supra note 40.
71 “Contingent Capital is debt that converts into equity when there is a crisis or when certain triggers are
met.” Definition of Contingent Capital, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=contingent-capital (last
visited Feb. 3, 2016).
72 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, supra note 40.
73 Id.
74 Press Release, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Oct. 9, 2012) http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20121009a.htm (on file with author).
75 Designations, supra note 5.
76 John Carney, Why Big Banks Are Being Treated Like Penny Stocks, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2016, 2:35
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-big-banks-are-being-treated-like-penny-stocks-1452886547.
77 Id.
78 Ryan Tracy et al., supra note 12.
79 Id.
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companies.80 Without the burden of the SIFI regulatory requirements, these
companies can demonstrate a better ROE.81
The Federal Reserve has not yet announced the regulations it will impose
on MetLife.82 However, in January 2015, MetLife became the first non-bank
SIFI to challenge its SIFI designation in court.83 Filing suit against FSOC in
D.C. federal court, MetLife complained that FSOC acted in an “arbitrary and
capricious” manner when it concluded that MetLife’s material financial
distress would pose a systemic risk to the American economy.84 The company
has argued that rather than presenting systemic risk, MetLife is “a source of
financial stability.”85 In March 2016, the court ruled in favor of MetLife,
holding that the SIFI designation process was procedurally flawed.86 The
government plans to appeal the decision.87 However, because the court
overturned the SIFI designation on procedural rather than substantive grounds,
FSOC may now redo the designation process and again label MetLife as a
SIFI.88
Despite the favorable ruling, MetLife had already begun a process to make
itself smaller and simpler. In January 2016, MetLife announced that it would
sell, spinoff, or take public one of its major lines of business: life insurance
products for individuals and families in the U.S.89 This is a major upset to
MetLife’s size, as this line of business generates about 20% of MetLife’s
annual earnings.90 Before the favorable ruling, MetLife executives stated that
the divestiture was due to the increased capital burden that the Federal Reserve

80

Id.
Id.
82 Leslie Scism, MetLife CEO Warned Federal Regulators in 2014 of Possible Breakup, Court Filing
Shows, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2016, 5:21 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/metlife-ceo-warned-federalregulators-in-2014-of-possible-breakup-court-filing-shows-1453933316.
83 Sistrunk, supra note 7.
84 Simson, supra note 10.
85 Jonathan Stempel, U.S. Says MetLife Too-Big-To-Fail Lawsuit Should be Dismissed, REUTERS (May
11, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-metlife-lawsuit-idUSKBN0NX01920150512.
86 Ryan Tracy & Erik Holm, MetLife Wins Bid to Shed ‘Systemically Important’ Label, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 20, 2016, 7:47 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-judge-rescinds-federal-governmentdetermination-that-metlife-is-systemically-important-1459349828?cb=logged0.4904358632269181.
87 Peter Schroeder, Government to appeal MetLife decision, THE HILL (Apr. 7, 2016, 1:16 PM),
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/275492-lew-judges-metlife-decision-is-wrong.
88 Ryan Tracy & Leslie Scism, Judge Rips ‘Unreasonable’ Decision on MetLife in Order—2nd Update,
NASDAQ (Apr. 7, 2016, 3:06 PM), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/judge-rips-unreasonable-decision-onmetlife-in-order—2nd-update-20160407-00899.
89 Scism, supra note 11.
90 Id.
81
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would likely require of MetLife.91 According to the company, SIFI status
places MetLife at a “competitive disadvantage,” since it faces more
burdensome capital and compliance requirements than non-SIFI insurers.92
Although the recent court decision shed MetLife of its SIFI status, MetLife is
continuing its planned divestiture.93 This move may reflect MetLife’s strategy
to avoid regulatory scrutiny in the future, as FSOC may ultimately again label
MetLife as a SIFI. However, even with the divestiture, MetLife will remain a
vast corporation.94 If its SIFI status were reinstated, MetLife would likely
retain SIFI status even after it sheds itself of its U.S. life insurance unit.95
However, MetLife expects that such a shrinkage would result in a more
tolerable capital burden.96
MetLife’s decision to downsize has put pressure on AIG.97 The billionaire
investor Carl Icahn, a major shareholder of AIG, has proposed that AIG break
up into three smaller companies, with each hopefully free of the SIFI label.98
However, AIG Chief Executive Peter Hancock opposes the break-up.99 AIG is
betting that since it has a lower risk profile than MetLife, the company-specific
regulations imposed on it by the Federal Reserve will be tolerable.100 In order
to persuade Icahn not to wage a proxy fight against AIG’s current
management, Hancock agreed to nominate Icahn to AIG’s board.101 Icahn,
however, still believes that “smaller and simpler” is the best strategy for
AIG.102 Until the Federal Reserve proposes the regulations facing AIG, it
remains to be seen whether AIG can accept the cost of SIFI status.
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IV. A NEW REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
The penalties levied on the “too big to fail” institutions are changing the
landscape of the financial services industry. Critics of the Dodd-Frank Act
state that the regulatory regime established by the Act is an unsupervised,
meddlesome bureaucracy that has done little to reduce systemic risk on Wall
Street.103 However, financial data demonstrates that large firms are shrinking
in order to meet the Federal Reserve’s standards. According to AIG in its
“living will,” released publically in January 2016, it has decreased “its total
assets by 53%, to $502 billion from $1.06 trillion; decreased total debt by 83%
to $31 billion from $176 billion, and increased shareholders’ equity 3% to $99
billion from $96 billion.”104 Furthermore, the banking industry has reduced
leverage and increased capital reserves. Since 2009, the largest banks in the
U.S. have increased their common equity capital by $641 billion.105
But the attempt to reform the “too big to fail” nature of Wall Street has also
resulted in a surprising and significant outcome: the federal government is
slowly transforming the United States’ longstanding system of state-based
insurance regulation. The Dodd-Frank Act created an advisory body within the
Department of the Treasury called the Federal Insurance Office (“FIO”).106
Although the FIO is not a regulatory agency, it serves to identify “issues or
gaps in the regulation of insurers that could contribute to a systemic crisis in
the insurance industry or the U.S. financial system.”107 But more important to
the transforming nature of insurance regulation is the authority that the federal
government yields over insurers through FSOC and the Federal Reserve.
FSOC is composed of both federal and state regulators, with members having
either a voting role or non-voting, advisory role.108 Voting members include

103 Jeb Hensarling, After Five Years, Dodd-Frank Is a Failure, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2015, 5:50 PM),
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105 Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review 2015: Assessment Framework and Results, BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Mar. 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/
bcreg/bcreg20150311a1.pdf.
106 About FIO, FEDERAL INSURANCE OFFICE, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/about-fio/Pages/
default.aspx (last updated June 12, 2013, 9:00 AM).
107 Id.; Federal Insurance Office, NAT’L ASS’N OF INSURANCE COMM’RS, http://www.naic.org/
cipr_topics/topic_fio.htm (last updated Jan. 11, 2016).
108 Who is on the Council?, FED. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
fsoc/about/council/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Oct. 14, 2014, 2:11 PM).
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the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, the Chairman of the SEC, and an independent
insurance expert appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.109
Non-voting members include the director of the FIO, a state banking
supervisor, a state insurance commissioner, and a state securities
commissioner.110 The mixed membership of state and federal regulators is
notable, as the entire system of insurance regulation has historically been
delegated to the states.111
Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, Congress established the
states’ primary responsibility in insurance regulation and prohibited the federal
government from superseding state authority in this area.112 Although the
federal government is statutorily mandated to separate itself from the insurance
regulatory system, the financial crisis has left it concerned with nationwide,
interconnected institutions, like insurance companies, that may threaten the
financial stability of the economy as a whole. Some argue that the Federal
Reserve’s authority over the three insurance SIFIs reflects the Federal
Reserve’s position as the de facto federal insurance regulator, as the three
SIFIs represent about one-fifth of the insurance industry in terms of assets.113
Even if one finds this argument overblown, it is difficult not to agree that the
inclusion of state regulators in FSOC demonstrates the federal government’s
attempt to balance its statutory mandate and its post-crisis concern with the
lack of federal oversight over the massive insurance industry.
However, recent events hint at a conflict between the Federal Reserve and
the state-based insurance regulatory system. The National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”), an organization composed of the
insurance regulatory departments of all fifty states and the District of
Columbia, submitted an amicus brief on behalf of MetLife in its suit against
FSOC.114 In its amicus brief, the NAIC argued that FSOC’s designation of
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MetLife as a SIFI demonstrated that “FSOC largely ignored or discounted the
state regulatory system,” and was a “flawed analysis of the insurance business
and its regulation.”115 It is likely that the current state-based insurance
regulatory system will continue to push back against the federal government’s
steps into the field of insurance regulation. The conflict may result in
redundancy and gridlock between two separate systems of regulation. But
hopefully the conflict results in a compromise: a regulatory regime that retains
the strengths of the current system and also decreases the possibility of
systemic risk, a distinctly interstate issue.
BEN PIERCE*

115

Id. at 3.
Emory University School of Law, J.D. Candidate, 2017; Executive Articles and Essays Editor, Emory
Corporate Governance and Accountability Review; B.A. English and American Literature, New York
University.
*

